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BALANCING MANDATE AND DISCRETION IN THE 
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN OF FEDERAL 
CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 
Robert L. Glicksman* 
As 2007 drew to a close, climate change dominated the environmental 
law and policy agenda.  A perfect storm of events has focused attention 
both in the media and on Capitol Hill, to an unprecedented degree, on the 
need to address climate change.1  These events include a series of reports on 
climate change issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) throughout 2007, the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to former Vice 
President Al Gore and the IPCC, the devastation wrought by Hurricane 
Katrina and discussion among scientists about whether climate change 
tends to increase hurricane intensity, the wildfires in southern California, a 
series of international climate change conferences culminating in a year-end 
conference under the United Nations Framework Convention of Climate 
Change2 in Bali, identification of links between climate change and national 
security,3 and the steady stream of scientific reports documenting the de-
gree to which climate change has already begun to alter the planetary envi-
ronment in ways that often exceed previous predictions.4  Late in 2007, a 
long-time congressional supporter of tougher fuel efficiency standards for 
automobiles, when discussing an energy bill to address aspects of climate 
change, stated: “Things are now dramatically and in a telescoped time 
 
*  Robert W. Wagstaff Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Kansas. 
1  But cf. William Schneider, Ignoring Global Warming, NAT’L J., Dec. 1, 2007, at 64 (bemoaning 
lack of press coverage of climate change in connection with the 2008 presidential campaign). 
2  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26, reprinted 
in 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992) (link). 
3  See, e.g., CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES & CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN 
SECURITY, THE AGE OF CONSEQUENCES: THE FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE (Kurt M. Campbell et al. eds., 2007), available at 
http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=EF316E06-AF99-
A12D-2B12-ABA46202C248&lng=en (link). 
4  See, e.g., Josep G. Canadell et al., Contributions to Accelerating Atmospheric CO2 Growth from 
Economic Activity, Carbon Intensity, and Efficiency of Natural Sinks, 104 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 47, 
18866 (Nov. 20, 2007) (finding that the carbon cycle “is generating stronger-than-expected and sooner-
than-expected climate forcing”); Ancient Ice Shelf Breaks Free in Canadian Arctic, MSNBC, Dec. 29, 
2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16390346/ (link) (reporting that dramatic events such as the snap-
ping off of the giant Ayles Ice Shelf in the Canadian Arctic in 2005 have convinced some scientists that 
the melting spurred by climate change is accelerating rapidly). 
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frame all coming together to address these issues that have been on a 30-
year detour.”5 
Professor Victor Flatt’s essay Taking the Legislative Temperature6 dis-
tills the policy issues reflected in the various bills on climate change pend-
ing near the end of the first session of the 110th Congress.  The issues he 
covers deal primarily with defining the substantive goals of climate change 
legislation and selecting appropriate policy instruments to achieve them.  
This Essay focuses more on the institutional design of a climate change re-
gime than on the kinds of substantive choices dealt with by Professor Flatt.  
Professor Flatt proceeds on the premise that Congress almost certainly will 
adopt legislation to address climate change soon, although the form of that 
legislation is uncertain.  This Essay, which responds to his, also operates on 
the assumption that Congress will act.  It deals largely with the question of 
who gets to define the goals of climate change legislation and select the 
means of achieving them.  These institutional design questions involve de-
termining how much discretion Congress should provide to those responsi-
ble for implementing climate change policy and determining who gets to 
exercise it.  The issues are familiar because discretion “lies at the root of 
administrative law doctrines and controversies.”7 
The bulk of the Essay considers how much discretion Congress should 
afford to federal agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) to decide whether to take steps to address climate change, and, as-
suming action is taken, precisely how to combat the potentially adverse 
consequences of climate change.  The final two sections address more 
briefly which federal agencies should be responsible for implementing fed-
eral climate change legislation and whether the adoption of federal legisla-
tion should preclude state and local climate change initiatives. 
My preliminary answer to the first of these discretion-related questions 
is that Congress should vest more discretion in agencies to decide how to 
address climate change than it does on the question of whether to do so.  In 
addition, in crafting the ground rules for federal administrative efforts to 
address climate change, Congress should build into its delegations of au-
thority sufficient administrative flexibility to adjust regulatory mechanisms.  
Such adjustments will be necessary to respond to the inevitable outpouring 
of new information about the causes and effects of climate change and the 
viability and effectiveness of available responses to it, some of which will 
reveal the erroneous assumptions on which previous administrative deci-
 
5  John M. Broder, Crossing a Threshold on Energy Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2007, at A22 
(comments of Rep. Edward J. Markey) (link). 
6  Victor B. Flatt, Taking the Legislative Temperature: Which Federal Climate Change Legislative 
Proposal Is “Best”?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 123 (2007), http://colloquy.law.northwestern.edu/ 
main/2007/12/taking-the-legi.html (link). 
7  KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE xvi (3d ed. 
1994). 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/5/ 197 
102:196  (2008) Balancing Mandate and Discretion 
sions were based.  Congress should concentrate the authority to lead the na-
tion’s climate change effort in the EPA, with the assistance of other agen-
cies with relevant expertise; but the authority to manage adaptation efforts 
might appropriately be divided among other agencies.  Finally, in the ab-
sence of a direct conflict in federal and state law, Congress should presume 
that divestment of concurrent state and local authority to adopt measures 
that address climate change is inappropriate. 
Global climate change is as complicated a problem as any addressed by 
existing environmental legislation because of the diversity of the sources of 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) that contribute to it and the potential magnitude 
of the effects of unabated GHG emissions.  Congress has several decades of 
experience upon which it may draw in developing a climate change pro-
gram.  The task nevertheless seems daunting.  In developing a regulatory 
regime for climate change, Congress should pay close attention to a series 
of institutional design choices.  These choices all relate to a common ques-
tion: Which entities are best situated to make the policy choices implicated 
in an effort to mitigate the adverse consequences of climate change?  I 
sketch out an argument here that Congress should require action on climate 
change, but that it should be wary of dictating too much of the substantive 
content of the resulting regulatory regimes.8  I also urge Congress to focus 
federal authority to mitigate climate change in the EPA, whose primary 
function is protection of the public health and the environment.  Agencies 
whose expertise lies elsewhere, such as the Departments of Transportation 
and Homeland Security, should contribute their expertise when relevant, but 
the effort should be coordinated by the EPA.  Finally, I argue briefly that 
Congress should preempt state or local law only in a narrow range of cir-
cumstances, so that all levels of government can contribute to the effort to 
avoid the ravages of unabated human-induced climate change. 
I. DELEGATED ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
POLICY 
Assuming that any climate change legislation that Congress adopts 
delegates implementation and enforcement responsibilities to administrative 
agencies, Congress must decide what kind of and how much discretion to 
hand over to those agencies.  I begin in the first section below by summariz-
ing two different forms of discretion, legislative and regulatory, and how 
they relate to one another.  Subsequent sections address discretion to deter-
mine whether to regulate or address climate change in some other manner, 
 
8  Regulation, as I use that term here, is not limited to traditional forms of regulation of the type 
sometimes pejoratively characterized as command-and-control, or even “Soviet-style” command-and-
control regulation.  See Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private Property 
Solution, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 533, 536 (2007) (link).  Rather, I use the term more expansively to in-
clude combinations of traditional regulation and market-based tools such as emissions trading and even 
pollution taxes.  I take no position here on the appropriate mix of those techniques. 
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discretion to determine the substantive content of regulation or other appro-
priate action, the identity of the agencies vested with responsibility to deal 
with climate change, and the role of state and local government in fashion-
ing a solution to climate change problems.  
A. Four Models of Delegated Authority 
Whenever Congress delegates decisionmaking authority to an adminis-
trative agency, it must decide how much discretion to vest in the agency to 
exercise the delegated authority.  In the regulatory context, this question has 
two parts.  First, Congress must decide how much discretion to give the 
agency to decide whether it is going to regulate.  Second, Congress must 
decide how much discretion the agency should have to determine the man-
ner in which it will regulate, assuming the agency has decided to regulate or 
Congress has dictated that it do so. 
In a previous article, Professor Sid Shapiro and I described how these 
two decisions relate to one another.9  When Congress delegates authority to 
an agency, it must define both the agency’s “regulatory discretion” (its au-
thority to determine whether to regulate) and its “legislative discretion” (its 
authority to determine how to regulate).  Congress can answer these ques-
tions by using any of four models of delegated authority.  Under the “dis-
cretionary” model, agencies have the most discretion concerning both 
whether and how to regulate.  The “ministerial” model affords minimal 
agency discretion on both questions.  An agency operating under the “pre-
scriptive” model has broad discretion over whether to regulate, but if it de-
cides to do so, it has minimal discretion over regulatory content.  A 
“coercive” statute delegates minimal discretion over whether to regulate, 
but affords substantial discretion to the agency to choose regulatory content. 
As Professor Shapiro and I explained, each model has its advantages 
and disadvantages.  When Congress adopts a new regulatory program, it 
must settle on the mix of legislative and regulatory discretion that is most 
likely to promote its substantive goals.  I argue here that the coercive 
model, with some modifications, is best suited to legislation seeking to 
mitigate and adapt to climate change. 
B. Who Decides Whether to Act? 
Congress decides how much regulatory discretion to grant agencies by 
allocating the authority to decide whether to regulate.  Congress may not 
trust the agency to regulate in a timely fashion.  It may fear, for example, 
that the agency cannot withstand pressure by potentially regulated entities 
to delay regulation or that the agency is otherwise hostile to legislative ob-
jectives.  Under these circumstances, Congress can withhold regulatory dis-
 
9  See generally Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the 
Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE L.J. 819. 
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cretion from the agency, either by mandating regulation by a specified 
deadline or by including regulatory mandates in the statute itself.  In the 
context of climate change, it seems important for Congress to keep regula-
tory discretion out of the hands of the agencies. 
Scientists have been alerting the world to the risks posed by human-
induced climate change for decades.  These warnings did not escape Con-
gress’s attention.  A Senate Report issued in 1989 described the threat of 
“uncontrolled global climate change” resulting from the accelerating accu-
mulation of GHGs in the atmosphere.10  Even then, the report referred to the 
existence of 
consensus on [a] critical point.  That is: by the time there is scientific proof for 
every detail of the problem, it will be too late to avoid the most devastating 
impacts of an intensified greenhouse effect and global climate change.  We can 
ill-afford to wait for 5 or 10 years of research before we take action to (1) limit 
the rate and extent of future climate change by reducing atmospheric emissions 
and concentrations of greenhouse gases, and (2) implement adaptation strate-
gies for coping with the changes to which we are already committed.11 
The consensus on the need for immediate action has only strengthened 
since then.  Most climate change researchers today also agree that the 
longer we wait before taking the actions described in the report, the more 
adverse effects we will be unable to reverse12 and the greater the cost will 
be to deal with the avoidable consequences of climate change.13 
Despite the Senate Committee’s warning, we have waited to act, and 
not just for five or ten years.  Nearly twenty years later, there is still no 
meaningful federal legislation specifically addressing global climate 
change.14  Congress surely deserves a large share of the blame for fiddling 
 
10  S. REP. NO. 101-228, at 377 (1989). 
11  Id. at 379–80. 
12  See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 508 F.3d 508, 
523 (9th Cir. 2007) (link) (referring to IPCC reports finding “that climate change may be non-linear, 
meaning that there are positive feedback mechanisms that may push global warming past a dangerous 
threshold (the ‘tipping point’)”); id. at 554–55 (quoting IPCC reports finding that “some impacts of an-
thropogenic climate change may be slow to become apparent, and some could be irreversible if climate 
change is not limited in both rate and magnitude before associated thresholds, whose positions may be 
poorly known, are crossed”) (emphasis omitted). 
13  See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT, 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 1, 20 (2007), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf [hereinafter IPCC, SYNTHESIS 
REPORT] (link) (finding that “[d]elayed emission reductions significantly constrain the opportunities to 
achieve lower stabilisation levels and increase the risk of more severe climate change impacts”);  STERN 
REVIEW, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ii, xxvii (2006), available at 
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk./media/4/3/Executive_Summary.pdf (link) (concluding that “[d]elay 
would be costly and dangerous” and that “the benefits of strong, early action considerably outweigh the 
costs”). 
14  Congress has authorized and financed research on climate change.  See, e.g., Global Change Re-
search Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-606, 104 Stat. 3096 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2921–2961 (1990)) 
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while southern California burns,15 but federal agencies and their political 
overseers in the executive branch also share that blame. 
The EPA has been the main culprit.  Instead of acting aggressively by 
relying on the Clean Air Act (CAA) to mandate reductions in GHG emis-
sions, the EPA took the position that it lacked the authority to regulate 
GHG emissions under the CAA.  According to the EPA, carbon dioxide and 
other GHGs do not qualify as “air pollutants” within the meaning of the 
Act.16  Alternatively, it claimed that even if GHGs are air pollutants, a lit-
any of policy reasons supported the agency’s refusal to regulate GHG emis-
sions.  The Supreme Court soundly rejected both arguments in 
Massachusetts v. EPA in 2007.17  First, it held that because GHGs “fit well 
within the [CAA’s] capacious definition of ‘air pollutant,’ . . . EPA has the 
statutory authority to regulate the emissions of such gases from new motor 
vehicles.”18  Second, it ruled that the EPA’s “laundry list of reasons not to 
regulate” provided “no reasoned explanation for its refusal to decide 
whether [GHGs] cause or contribute to climate change.”19 
                                                                                                                          
Opinions differ on whether the Court’s decision requires that the EPA 
regulate GHG emissions and, if so, what kinds of sources it must regulate.  
The Court stated that on remand the “EPA can avoid taking further action 
[to regulate GHG emissions from motor vehicles] only if it determines that 
[GHGs] do not contribute to climate change or if it provides some reason-
able explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion to de-
termine whether they do.”20  Under one reading of the case, the Court’s 
ruling “leaves the EPA free to decide not to regulate, so long as it provides 
adequate justification for its decision.”21  Another view is that the opinion 
effectively forces the EPA to regulate GHG emissions not only from mo-
bile, but also from stationary sources.22  Yet, at the end of 2007, the EPA 
 
(link); see also Dan Mensher, Comment, Common Law on Ice: Using Judge-Made Nuisance Law to Ad-
dress the Interstate Effects of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 ENVTL. L. 463, 479–80 (2007) (link) (de-
scribing non-regulatory strategies pursued by Congress). 
15  Climate change exacerbates the risk of wildfires, like those that occurred in California in late 
2007, by causing earlier snowmelts and longer dry seasons in mountainous and forested areas.  See 
ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 558 (5th ed. 2007).  
16  The CAA defines “air pollutant” as “any air pollutant agent . . . , including any physical, chemi-
cal, biological . . . substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.”  42 
U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2000) (link). 
17  127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (link). 
18  Id. at 1462. 
19  Id. at 1462–63. 
20  Id. at 1462. 
21  Kathryn A. Watts & Amy J. Wildermuth, Massachusetts v. EPA: Breaking New Ground on Is-
sues Other Than Global Warming, 102 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 1, 1 (2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/Colloquy/2007/17/ (link). 
22  See, e.g., Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Controlling Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Mobile Sources—
Massachusetts v. EPA, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. 10535, 10538 (2007) (“[T]he Court’s opinion pushes [the] 
EPA to find that GHGs need to be regulated.”). 
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denied California’s request to be allowed to implement its own regulations 
restricting CO2 from motor vehicles.23  At the same time, the EPA hinted 
that Congress’s adoption of more stringent fuel efficiency standards for 
automobiles might preclude the need for federal GHG emissions controls.24 
Given the EPA’s continuing resistance to regulating GHG emissions, 
Congress should remove any doubt as to the need for climate change legis-
lation by mandating regulation within a specified time frame.25  One possi-
bility is to adopt a statute that sets an objective (such as reduction of GHG 
emissions by a specified percentage by a specified deadline) and requires 
that the agency issue regulations applicable to listed categories of sources to 
achieve that goal, again, within a certain time.  The statute should also in-
clude a citizen suit provision allowing individuals or groups to sue to force 
compliance with that requirement so that judicial supervision and coercion 
are available if the EPA fails to comply with its obligations.26 
One of the principal disadvantages of divesting agencies of legislative 
discretion is the potential for statutory deadlines to divert agency resources 
away from matters that the agency deems worthy of a higher priority than 
the ones covered by the deadlines.  This concern provides little, if any, rea-
son to hesitate in forcing action via congressional mandate.  There is broad 
scientific consensus that rapid action is necessary, and that delay will pre-
clude effective action in some respects and significantly increase the costs 
of dealing with climate change in others.27  The risk of resource misalloca-
tion and misplaced priorities now appears less troublesome than the risk 
that continued inaction by a dithering agency will exacerbate the adverse ef-
fects of climate change.  In short, there ought to be no higher environmental 
priority than dealing with climate change, and Congress should acknowl-
edge the urgency of the problem by requiring the EPA to act soon. 
 
23  Press Release, U.S. EPA, America Receives a National Solution for Vehicle Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions (Dec. 19, 2007), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/names/hq_2007-12-
19_waiver2 (link). 
24  See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 102(a), 121 Stat. 
1492 (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 32902(b)(2)) (link). 
25  Professor Lisa Heinzerling argues that “the precautionary moment for action on climate change—
the period in which we might have acted based on something less than a scientific consensus on the 
causes and consequences of climate change—has passed,” and that there is “a moral imperative for ac-
tion—dramatic action, now—on this problem.”  Lisa Heinzerling, Climate Change, Human Health, and 
the Post-Cautionary Principle, 96 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 2), available at 
http://ssrn.com/AbstractID=1008923 (link). 
26  If Congress adds climate change provisions to the existing CAA, that statute’s citizen suit provi-
sion should suffice.  42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (2000) (link).  Citizen suit provisions routinely appear in the 
federal pollution control laws.  See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000) (link); Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act , 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2000) (link). 
27  See supra note 13 and accompanying text.  The coercive model also creates the risk that an 
agency subject to a coercive mandate will take action within the statutory deadline that does not comport 
substantively with congressional aims, given the breadth of the regulatory discretion afforded the agency 
under a coercive (as opposed to a ministerial) statute.  That risk is addressed in § I-C below. 
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If Congress decides to allow the EPA to decide whether to regulate, it 
should at least facilitate the agency’s ability to do so in order to minimize 
the chance that any regulation the agency chooses to adopt will be derailed 
by litigation.  If Congress authorizes but does not mandate agency action, it 
must specify the circumstances in which the agency is empowered to act.  It 
does so by specifying a “statutory trigger” that defines the circumstances in 
which it may regulate.  The triggers in federal environmental legislation 
vary.  Some statutes authorize protective agency action without any proof 
that the targeted activities are responsible for creating health, safety, or en-
vironmental problems—Congress itself made the determination that regula-
tion is appropriate.  Other statutes condition the exercise of regulatory 
authority on the production of evidence that crosses some minimal thresh-
old level of risk or harm.  Some of these environmental statutes require that 
the agency demonstrate risk, while others require a showing of significant 
risk.28  Because of the overwhelming scientific agreement that GHGs con-
tribute to climate change, Congress should include the first sort, a “no 
threshold” trigger, in any climate change legislation it adopts by authorizing 
regulation of all sources of GHG emissions without the need for further 
substantiation of a link between GHG emissions and climate change. 
C. Who Decides How to Act? 
Once Congress has settled on how much legislative discretion to dele-
gate to an agency to decide whether and when to act, it must determine how 
much regulatory discretion to provide.  The answer depends on how gener-
ally or specifically Congress defines the substantive content of the regula-
tory program.  The choice here is between fashioning legislation that fits the 
coercive model or ministerial model.  The main reason to limit regulatory 
discretion is to reduce the opportunity for agencies to pursue a regulatory 
approach that deviates from congressional intent.  The regulation may devi-
ate because it is too weak, too strong, covers a broader or narrower range of 
activities than Congress deems appropriate, or allocates the costs and risks 
of regulation differently than Congress would have done under more spe-
cific statutory guidance.  The potential pitfall of dictating the content of 
regulation is the risk that Congress lacks the expertise to craft a program as 
effective, as efficient, or as fair as one resulting from reliance on the 
agency’s broader expertise and experience in dealing with like matters. 
Any climate change regulatory regime will have to address a broad 
range of substantive questions.  The most basic question is how to define 
 
28  Examples of each of these triggers are provided in SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. 
GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 32–34 (2003).  See also 
GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 75. 
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the program’s goal.29  Should the program seek to mitigate the adverse ef-
fects of climate change, facilitate adaptation to any climate changes that oc-
cur, or both?  This question is so important that Congress should address it, 
and the proper answer, in my view, is: both.  More specific goals might in-
clude how great a reduction in GHG emissions we should strive to achieve.  
As Professor Flatt’s essay indicates, most of the proposals pending before 
Congress include a relatively specific “effects target,” despite the scientific 
uncertainty surrounding the impact of climate change.  Congress has taken 
similar questions out of the EPA’s hands in other contexts.  In the 1990 
CAA amendments, for example, Congress defined the purpose of the acid 
deposition control program to be a reduction of annual emissions of sulfur 
dioxide by ten million tons from 1980 emission levels and of nitrogen oxide 
emissions by approximately two million tons from 1980 levels.30  Congress 
ought to be able to fashion a similar goal for climate change legislation by 
relying on the published research of organizations such as the IPCC.31 
Another fundamental question relates to the kind of government inter-
vention Congress wants to authorize in its quest to mitigate climate change.  
The choices include reliance on information disclosure,32 common law li-
ability mechanisms, economic incentives that may be either positive (such 
as subsidies) or negative (such as a carbon tax) in nature, traditional regula-
tion, or some combination of these techniques.  If Congress decides to rely 
on traditional regulation, it must choose among a broad array of the avail-
able types of environmental regulation.33 
The choice of regulatory approach, too, should be within Congress’s 
zone of competence, based on nearly forty years of experience with adopt-
ing and overseeing various types of environmental regulation.  Congress 
should not allow the EPA, for example, to decide whether information dis-
closure is a sufficient mechanism to abate GHG emissions.34  It is not, as 
the Bush Administration’s reliance on a package of information disclosure 
and voluntary approaches to GHG emissions reductions has shown.  Con-
gress should instead either impose a carbon tax or dictate restrictions on 
 
29  Professor Flatt explains the available choices in Part I of his Essay, including specifying an “ef-
fects target,” deciding whether to protect U.S. or worldwide interests, and deciding whether to compen-
sate those harmed by climate change.  Flatt, supra note 6, at 126. 
30  42 U.S.C. § 7651(b) (2000) (link).  Congress can define such goals in qualitative rather than 
quantitative terms.  See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (2000) (link) (specifying the interim goal of the 
Clean Water Act as the achievement of water quality suitable for protection and propagation of fish and 
wildlife and for recreation). 
31  See, e.g., IPCC, SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 13, at 21, Table SPM.6 (providing required 
emission levels for stabilization of atmospheric CO2 concentrations at different levels).  
32  Cf. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1101–11050 (2000) 
(link) (requiring public disclosure of the production, processing, or use of certain toxic chemicals). 
33  The basic risk management techniques available are discussed in SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra 
note 28, at 32, 34–44; GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 75–77. 
34  See Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 9, at 841 (arguing that many policy decisions do not turn 
on the kinds of fact questions as to which agencies have more expertise than legislators do). 
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GHG emissions.  Congress also should decide whether to allow regulated 
entities to rely on the best available technology that already exists or to 
adopt restrictions on GHG emissions that force regulated entities to develop 
more effective technologies.  Congress has engaged in technology-forcing 
in past environmental statutes,35 and it should do so in any climate change 
legislation it adopts.  Business as usual will not be sufficient.  Although ex-
haustive analysis of the appropriate mix of risk management techniques is 
not the purpose of this Essay, it is hard to imagine a more appropriate venue 
for technology-forcing than climate change legislation, given the magnitude 
of the threat, the short window of opportunity in which effective efforts to 
avoid the worst impacts of climate change are possible, and the opposition 
by some industry segments to climate change regulation to date.  If Con-
gress decides to force technology, it should specifically authorize the EPA 
to issue regulations with that effect.  Unless it does so, there is a risk that 
the courts will interpret the statute as limiting the EPA to the issuance of 
regulations based on existing technology.36 
Implementation of market-based mechanisms such as cap-and-trade 
programs requires many more specific decisions, such as whether to use a 
one-to-one ratio or a greater than one-to-one ratio for trades.  So does im-
plementation of regulation designed to force industries to perform as well as 
current technology allows.  The EPA must identify the best available tech-
nology for a particular industry and calculate the performance-based results 
that the identified technology is capable of achieving.37  Industry is then 
free to comply by using the identified technology or any other means it pre-
fers that allow more efficient compliance.  Many of these matters are 
probably better left to administrative discretion than congressional direc-
tion.38  The typical explanation for delegating the task of formulating the 
specifics of regulatory programs to administrative agencies relates to insti-
tutional competence.  Congress historically has “concluded that an agency 
staffed by people with expertise in some specialized field would be able to 
 
35  See, e.g., Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 257 (1976) (link) (finding that the CAA was 
“expressly designed to force regulated sources to develop pollution control devices that might at the 
time appear to be economically or technologically infeasible”); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 
655 F.2d 318, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
36  Cf. Bluewater Network v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (link) (rejecting claim that emission 
standards for snowmobiles did not press hard enough); Int’l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 
615, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (expressing “grave doubts” as to EPA’s prediction that necessary technology 
would be available in time to meet EPA’s tailpipe emission standards under the CAA). 
37  Professor Flatt’s paper addresses many of the questions that would arise if Congress were to en-
dorse a cap-and-trade program for GHG emissions. 
38  If these subsidiary matters involve fundamental policy choices, Congress should not defer to 
agency discretion.  Congress should decide, for example, whether to give away, sell, or auction GHG 
emission rights, a choice that will affect the allocation of the costs of controlling GHG emissions.  Pro-
fessor Flatt argues that sale or auction is the superior choice.  See Flatt, supra note 6, at 139. 
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do a better job than Congress in issuing rules of conduct in the agency’s 
area of expertise.”39 
There are many issues for which it makes sense to rely on administra-
tive expertise to identify optimal regulatory design questions, particularly in 
light of the broad range of activities that contribute to climate change and 
the extensive range of scientific disciplines that are relevant to different as-
pects of dealing with it.40  On the other hand, the high visibility of climate 
change research in the popular press and the scientific and policy literature 
should make much of the information relevant to the judgments needed to 
implement a climate change regime accessible to legislators and their staffs.  
Legislative testimony by agency officials and experts in the physical and 
social sciences can provide additional relevant information.41  Comparative 
institutional competence considerations therefore argue, though not over-
whelmingly, in favor of affording considerable regulatory discretion to the 
agencies vested with the power to administer a new climate change pro-
gram. 
The pervasiveness of scientific uncertainty, which is perhaps the single 
most defining characteristic of environmental law,42 provides even stronger 
support for the delegation of regulatory discretion.  Environmental policy-
makers (including legislators and agency officials) often operate within the 
rubric of “bounded rationality,” as their efforts to understand the implica-
tions of key choices are impaired by the unavailability of key information.  
Certain issues concerning climate change are now beyond reasonable de-
bate, including the link between increasing concentrations of CO2 and other 
GHGs in the atmosphere and rising air and sea surface temperatures, and 
the link between human activities (such as the burning of fossil fuels) and 
those increasing concentrations.  But other matters are less well understood, 
such as the pace and extent to which climate change will result in melting 
ice sheets and rising sea levels.  Even with respect to areas that are rela-
tively well understood, however, our knowledge base is constantly being 
updated.  The pace of scientific discoveries and analyses concerning the 
causes of, effects of, and techniques for addressing climate change has been 
 
39  RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1–2 (2008). 
40  See, e.g., David E. Adelman, Scientific Activism and Restraint: The Interplay of Statistics, Judg-
ment, and Procedure in Environmental Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 497, 540 (2004) (referring to 
“studies in areas as diverse as lake ecology, glaciology, tropospheric chemistry, and volcanism [that] are 
being conducted under the umbrella of climate change research”). 
41  See Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 9, at 841–42 (arguing that “Congress has substantial re-
sources, including the expertise of its members and staff, its hearing process, the advice of the agency 
itself, and of other outside organizations, to obtain and evaluate the technical information necessary to 
make” factual determinations that inform policy judgments). 
42  See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Precaution, Science, and Learning While Doing in Natural Resource 
Management, 82 WASH. L. REV. 547, 548 (2007) (link) (stating that “[u]ncertainty is the unifying hall-
mark of environmental and natural resource regulation”). 
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breathtaking in recent years.43  As one federal district court explained, re-
cent climate change research has revealed “the rapidity of evolution of 
measurable changes in climate instability and evince[d] a growing consen-
sus that human-caused [GHG] emissions must be curtailed more rather than 
less and sooner rather than later.”44 
The rapid advances in scientific knowledge about climate change and 
how to deal with it have implications for the design of environmental regu-
latory programs.  Bounded rationality ensures that environmental policy-
makers will make mistakes because key relevant information is not 
available to them, they do not yet understand its implications, or the cir-
cumstances that initially justified a particular regulatory approach have 
changed.  Relying on uncertainty as a reason to avoid making mistaken de-
cisions is a prescription for endless delay.  But regulation should be crafted 
to allow agencies to shift tactics if the initial rules produce results that are 
inconsistent with the purposes of regulation, unnecessarily inefficient, or 
unfair, provided any new approach conforms to fundamental legislative ob-
jectives.45  Professor Flatt’s essay provides an example of how new infor-
mation may upset a regulatory applecart.  He discusses the possibility that 
some pending proposals for carbon offsets are based on suspect science, 
such as the assumption that carbon sinks will reduce climate change or that 
bioengineering efforts such as seeding the oceans with iron filings will 
cause more good than harm.  The question is whether bounded rationality of 
this kind suggests that the coercive or ministerial approach would be a bet-
ter fit for climate change regulation. 
It is no secret that the legislative process typically works slowly, some-
times excruciatingly so.  The administrative process is also often cumber-
some.46  But the administrative process is typically more capable of 
responding expeditiously to new information than the legislative process is.  
This is particularly true if the authorizing statute requires certain risk man-
agement techniques and prohibits others, such as cost-benefit analysis.  
Cost-benefit analysis is designed to “rationalize” regulation by ensuring that 
 
43  See, e.g., Seth Borenstein, Ominous Arctic Melt Worries Experts (Dec. 11, 2007), 
http://www.worldnewstrust.com/news/ominous-arctic-melt-worries-experts-seth-borenstein.html (link) 
(describing data showing that the Arctic Ocean could be nearly ice-free at the end of the summer of 
2012, much faster than previous predictions).  See also supra note 4; American Association for the Ad-
vancement of Science, Board Releases New Statement on Climate Change (Feb. 18, 2007), available at 
http://www.aaas.org/news/press_room/climate_change/mtg_200702/aaas_climate_statement.pdf (link) 
(stating that “[t]he pace of change and the evidence of harm have increased markedly over the last five 
years”). 
44  Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstone, 2007 WL 4372878, No. CV F 04-6663 AWI 
LJO, at *18 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2007) (link). 
45  SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 28, at 158. 
46  See generally Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 
41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992). 
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it is consistent with efficient resource allocation.47  The technique provides 
a misleading veneer of precision in the environmental context, however, be-
cause it is difficult to monetize regulatory costs and benefits.  Cost predic-
tions are sometimes unreliable because the information upon which 
calculations are based is provided mostly by the regulated entities them-
selves, who have an obvious reason to overestimate those costs.  Monetiza-
tion of benefits is even trickier because it often entails placing a numerical 
value on preserving an endangered species, avoiding illness, or even saving 
a human life.  More to the current point, cost-benefit analysis and related ef-
forts to achieve regulatory “rationality” tend to significantly slow down the 
output of regulatory processes.48 
Elsewhere, Professor Shapiro and I have urged Congress to forego ef-
forts to rationalize environmental regulation at the “front end” of the regula-
tory process (such as the issuance of regulations applicable to a class or 
category of activities).49  We contend that Congress should instead allow 
agencies to make “back-end” adjustments through waivers, deadline exten-
sions, periodic review of regulations, and similar techniques to accommo-
date past mistaken or incomplete judgments.50  A climate change program 
with that kind of built-in flexibility would allow an agency such as the EPA 
to adjust its approaches in response to new developments that cast doubt on 
previous factual assumptions or reveal new problems or opportunities.  A 
program with back-end flexibility instead of front-end rigidity enhances the 
ability of agencies to adapt regulatory strategies to changed circumstances 
so that regulatory decisions conform better to legislative objectives.  The 
eligibility of GHGs other than CO2 as CO2 equivalents is one example from 
Professor Flatt’s essay of an issue that might be appropriately treated 
through back-end adjustments.  As Flatt points out, allowing the EPA to 
recognize GHGs other than those named in the statute, or to adjust the level 
at which equivalency is deemed to occur, can provide flexibility to identify 
efficient GHG reduction possibilities. 
Legislation that minimizes the legislative discretion of agencies but af-
fords them significant regulatory discretion creates opportunities for slip-
page between legislative design and administrative implementation.51  A 
coercive statute requires that agencies act in accordance with legislative 
 
47  See Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Law After the Counter-Reformation: Restoring Faith in 
Pragmatic Government, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 689, 706 (2000); Debra A. Stone, Clinical Authority in the 
Construction of Citizenship, in PUBLIC POLICY FOR DEMOCRACY 45, 46 (Helen Ingram & Stephen Rath-
geb Smith eds., 1993). 
48  Id. 
49  Robert L. Glicksman & Sidney A. Shapiro, Improving Regulation Through Incremental Adjust-
ment, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1179, 1183–84 (2004) (link). 
50  See also SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 28, at 158–77. 
51  Slippage may occur when the substance of agency regulation deviates from congressional intent.  
Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in Environ-
mental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297–300 (1999) (link). 
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timetables.  Although citizen suits or other judicial review provisions are 
often available to force compliance with deadlines, the courts are some-
times reluctant to order agencies to perform tasks that the agencies deem 
impossible.52  In addition, Supreme Court decisions in cases such as Norton 
v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance53 create threshold justiciability obsta-
cles for plaintiffs challenging an agency’s failure to act under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA).54  
Another problem with a statute that compels action but does little to 
define its content is the risk that deferential judicial review of a challenged 
regulation will fail to identify and reverse agency decisions that stray from 
congressional intent.  One way for Congress to address these problems is to 
use “hammer” provisions.  These provisions afford an agency a specified 
time within which to take regulatory action.  If the agency does not act 
within that time, a regulatory result set forth in the statute automatically 
goes into effect.  Alternatively, the statute itself may prescribe a substantive 
result that remains in effect unless and until the agency takes action, within 
bounds set forth in the statute, to change the initial statutory landscape.55 
The benefit of using hammer provisions to establish default rules in the 
absence of agency action is that they reverse the normal incentives of regu-
lated entities (and agencies solicitous of their interests or otherwise hostile 
to the statutes they administer) to delay in issuing regulations.  The threat of 
having to live with statutory default rules, particularly if they are onerous, 
can spur both the agency and regulated entities to move expeditiously to 
meet statutory deadlines.  The hammer mechanism also acknowledges that 
agencies may have greater expertise than legislators and their staffers.  If 
the statutory default rule reflects a misunderstanding of the factual context 
or policy implications involved, the agency can correct legislative errors by 
overriding the statutory default rules.  As a result, hammers combine some 
of the benefits (and avoid some of the downsides) of coercive and ministe-
rial statutes.  Congress should consider including hammers in climate 
change legislation.  The nature of the hammers will depend, of course, on 
 
52  Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 9, at 834–35. 
53  542 U.S. 55 (2004) (link). 
54  The Court in SUWA required that plaintiffs seeking an order compelling agency action unlawfully 
withheld pursuant to § 706(1) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), show “that an agency failed to take a dis-
crete agency action that it is required to take.”  SUWA, 542 U.S. at 64.  See generally Robert L. Glicks-
man, Securing Judicial Review of Agency Inaction (and Action) in the Wake of Norton v. Southern Utah 
Wilderness Alliance, in STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SUCCESS IN AN UNCERTAIN JUDICIAL 
CLIMATE 163 (Michael A. Wolf, ed.) (2005).  The presence of a statutory deadline should enable plain-
tiffs challenging noncompliance with a coercive statute to show that the agency was required to act.  
Further, a regulation should qualify as a “discrete” action.  See 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2000) (defining 
“agency action” to include “the whole or a part of an agency rule”).  Cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. 
Ct. 1438, 1459 (2007) (link) (ruling that “[r]efusals to promulgate rules are thus susceptible to judicial 
review, though such review is ‘extremely limited’ and ‘highly deferential’”). 
55  See Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 9, at 839–40 & nn.96–98 (providing examples of both 
kinds of statutory hammers). 
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the regulatory approach Congress chooses to adopt.  If Congress decides to 
rely on technology-based regulations, for example, it could set deadlines for 
the promulgation of emission controls on certain GHG source categories.  If 
the EPA misses the deadlines, statutory default rules could sharply curtail 
GHG emissions from appropriate source categories or even phase them out 
entirely. 
D. Which Federal Agency or Agencies? 
Another set of questions that Congress will have to address as it devel-
ops a climate change program is which federal agencies should play a part 
in the implementation of that program.  The EPA obviously will have to 
play a significant role, but other federal agencies also have relevant exper-
tise.  The contribution of automotive emissions of CO2 to climate change 
suggests that the Department of Transportation (DOT), and particularly the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), should be in-
volved in a federal climate change program.  NHTSA is responsible for is-
suing corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards under the Energy 
Policy and Conservation Act of 1975.56  The roles of electricity generation 
and energy consumption in climate change make the Department of Energy 
(DOE) an obvious player.  The national security implications of climate 
change57 may require the participation of the Department of Defense or the 
Department of Homeland Security.  Disaster management following events 
like ferocious storms or coastal flooding that may be linked to climate 
change58 may involve the Federal Emergency Management Agency.  The 
impact of fossil fuel production and use on climate change may support 
changes in national energy policy that affect development of mineral re-
sources on public lands administered by the National Forest Service and the 
Bureau of Land Management.  These agencies do not exhaust the list of po-
tential contributors, given the broad array of sources that contribute to cli-
mate change and the myriad effects that climate change is likely to produce. 
Coordination of agency efforts to deal with climate change is essential.  
In May 2007, President Bush issued an executive order announcing a fed-
eral policy “to ensure the coordinated and effective exercise of the authori-
ties of the President and the heads of the Department of Transportation, the 
Department of Energy, and the Environmental Protection Agency to protect 
the environment with respect to” GHG emissions from motor vehicles and 
 
56  Pub. L. No. 94-163, § 301, 89 Stat. 871 (1975) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 32906–
32919 (2006)).  The CAFE standards reflect “the sales weighted average fuel economy, expressed in 
miles per gallon (mpg), of a manufacturer’s fleet of passenger cars or light trucks with a gross vehicle 
weight rating (GVWR) of 8,500 lbs. or less, manufactured for sale in the United States, for any given 
model year.” National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), CAFE Overview—Frequently 
Asked Questions, http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/cafe/overview.htm (link). 
57  See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
58  See generally Robert L. Glicksman, Global Climate Change and the Risks to Coastal Areas From 
Hurricanes and Rising Sea Levels: The Costs of Doing Nothing, 52 LOY. L. REV. 1127 (2006) (link). 
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nonroad engines.59  Unfortunately, although the Order recognizes the value 
of coordination, it provides a model of how not to achieve it.   
There are at least two problems with the Executive Order.  First, it cre-
ates only a vague mandate to “cooperate” among the three agencies rather 
than providing any one of them with the principal authority to develop fed-
eral climate change policy in connection with motor vehicle emissions of 
GHGs.  Second, it vests supervisory authority in an entity, the Office of 
Management and Budget, that lacks expertise in the substantive scientific 
issues most relevant to the development and implementation of climate 
change policy. 
A better approach would be to use the concepts of lead and cooperating 
agencies used under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).60  
Under the regulations issued by the Council on Environmental Quality 
(CEQ) to implement NEPA, a lead agency is responsible for supervising the 
preparation of an environmental impact statement if more than one federal 
agency proposes or is involved in the same action or is involved in a group 
of related actions.61  The regulations direct the agencies to decide for them-
selves which agency should take on the lead role, but reserves to the CEQ 
the authority to designate a lead agency if the involved agencies fail to 
agree.62  The regulations also specify the nature of the relationship between 
the lead agency and any cooperating agencies, including those requested by 
the lead agency to provide input because of their “special expertise” on 
relevant environmental issues.63 
Further, Congress should designate the lead agency in the statute itself.  
The lead agency need not be the same for every issue implicated in climate 
change.  The EPA is the obvious candidate for issues relating to the control 
of GHG emissions from mobile or stationary sources that contribute to cli-
mate change, and it should receive the lion’s share of lead agency responsi-
bilities.64  It also should be responsible for administering any cap-and-trade 
 
59  Exec. Order No. 13432, § 1, 72 Fed. Reg. 27,717, 27,717 (May 14, 2007) (link). 
60  42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370f (2000) (link). 
61  40 C.F.R. § 1501.5(a) (2008) (link). 
62  40 C.F.R. § 1501.5(c), (e) (2008) (link). 
63  40 C.F.R. § 1501.6 (2008) (link). 
64  Cf. Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstone, 2007 WL 4372878, No. CV F 04-6663 AWI 
LJO at *14 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2007) (citing Massachusetts v. EPA and noting that “EPA is specifically 
tasked with protection of the public health and welfare under the Clean Air Act, and that DOT, under 
EPCA, is not”).  Similarly, the district court concluded that, in the event of a conflict between the CAFE 
standards under EPCA and federal emission controls (or state emission controls approved by EPA) un-
der the CAA, it is NHTSA’s responsibility to accommodate its standards to those of EPA or the state, 
not vice versa.  See id. at *16.  Not all observers agree that EPA is the obvious choice to play the lead 
role in reducing GHG emissions.  The White House and Congress have sparred over the designation of 
the agency responsible for controlling decisions concerning automotive fuel efficiency.  See John M. 
Broder, Veto of Auto Mileage Bill Is Raised as a Possibility, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2007, at A27 (nat’l 
ed.) (link) (reporting that anonymous White House sources indicated that the Bush Administration fa-
vors allocating that responsibility to NHTSA, not EPA). 
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program that Congress chooses to adopt.  Issues with national security im-
plications might become the domain of the Department of Defense, al-
though the statute should narrowly define national security matters to 
prevent the Department from encroaching on the EPA’s authority.  Respon-
sibilities concerning particular adaptation measures should be placed within 
the domain of agencies that include FEMA and the federal land manage-
ment agencies.  The two essential components of the portions of climate 
change legislation that spell out agency responsibilities are to put one 
agency in charge of decisions on particular issues and to match the alloca-
tion of these responsibilities to the relevant substantive expertise of the 
agencies concerned. 
E. The Role of State and Local Governments 
One final question that deserves brief mention here is the role of state 
and local governments in addressing climate change.  Since 1970, the fed-
eral government has played the dominant role in regulating activities that 
are potentially harmful to public health and the environment.65  Relying on 
a “cooperative federalism” model, Congress has created and delegated envi-
ronmental protection responsibilities to federal agencies, but has directed 
them to solicit the input and participation of the states.66  Regulation of ac-
tivities that contribute to climate change has sharply deviated from the co-
operative federalism norm.  The federal government has largely ignored the 
problem, spurring state and local governments to adopt a variety of pro-
grams that deal with different aspects of climate change.67  When Congress 
adopts climate change legislation, it must address whether to preempt state 
and local initiatives.  Indeed, Congress has already begun to address this 
question as it considers whether federal fuel efficiency standards or restric-
tions on GHG emissions from cars and trucks should displace state con-
straints on GHG emissions.68 
A full-fledged discussion of preemption of state and local climate 
change programs is beyond the scope of this Essay.  The point here is sim-
ply that there are good reasons for Congress to hesitate before deciding to 
displace state and local initiatives.  These include preserving the ability of 
these levels of government to produce novel approaches that may subse-
 
65  See Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse Mutation 
of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 747 (2006) (link). 
66  See id. at 722-54. 
67  See generally Jonathan H. Adler, When Is Two A Crowd?  The Impact of Federal Action on State 
Environmental Regulation, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 67 (2007) (link); Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating 
Global Climate Change in the United States: A Regional Approach, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 54 (2005) 
(link); Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 281 (2003) (link). 
68  See John M. Broder & Micheline Maynard, Lawmakers Set Deal on Raising Fuel Efficiency, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 1, 2007, at A1 (link). 
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quently be put to good use at the federal level,69 maintaining other benefits 
of intersystemic interaction that is inherent in federalist forms of govern-
ment, and protecting against the risk of regulatory failure.70  Professor Rich-
ard Levy and I have argued elsewhere that Congress should not preempt 
state law that is more protective than federal law unless there are strong jus-
tifications in collective action terms for doing so.  These justifications 
might include the need to strengthen the bargaining position of the national 
government in international negotiations, the need for uniform national 
standards to reduce transaction costs and other regulatory burdens, or the 
need for federal regulation to combat efforts by states to exclude harmful 
activities that, if located elsewhere, would benefit them.71 
One example of the myriad approaches states have taken to climate 
change involves renewable portfolio standards (RPS), which are designed 
to force utilities to provide at least a minimum percentage of the electricity 
they generate from renewable energy sources.  Some states have not 
adopted any such requirements.  Those that did have pursued widely diver-
gent approaches.  Massachusetts required that four percent of the state’s 
electricity supply come from new renewable sources by 2009.  Maine regu-
lations required that 30 percent of the state’s power come from renewable 
sources by 2000.72  Collective action principles provide no basis for pre-
empting these state standards, which should neither interfere with federal 
GHG emission controls nor impose externalities on other states.  Thus far, 
Congress has refused to adopt minimum federal RPSs as a means of foster-
ing the development of clean energy sources.  If it does so in the future, 
however, state RPSs that require that utilities provide a lower percentage of 
their electricity from clean sources than the federal statute does presumably 
would be preempted. 
II. CONCLUSION 
Substance matters.  The substantive elements of any federal climate 
change legislation will largely dictate its effectiveness in mitigating and 
 
69  See, e.g., Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What Is Motivating State 
and Local Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does This Say About Federalism and 
Environmental Law?, 38 URB. LAW. 1015 (2006) (link). 
70  See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Dis-
tinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1555–56, 1592–99 (2007) (link); see also Kirsten H. Engel, Harness-
ing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 163 (2006) (link) 
(“Preemption . . . is the real boogeyman of public interest lawmaking because it prevents the political 
process from policing itself.”). 
71  See Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemp-
tion by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 11–12), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1007021 (link). 
72  See Pew Center on Global Climate Change, States with Renewable Portfolio Standards, 
http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/rps.cfm (link). 
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adapting to global climate change.  But institutional design matters, too; 
process and structure affect substance.  This Essay has focused on institu-
tional design issues that bear on the impact of federal climate change legis-
lation because they will shape significantly the substantive content of 
implementing actions under that legislation.  All of the choices discussed 
above deal in some way with allocation of the responsibility for dictating 
the substance of climate change law and policy. 
Most basically, Congress must decide which substantive decisions to 
make itself and which ones to delegate to federal administrative agencies.  
The suggestion here is that Congress make the most fundamental policy de-
cisions (such as whether to rely on carbon taxes or regulatory restrictions on 
GHG emissions and whether to give away or sell any GHG emissions al-
lowances it creates) itself and delegate the authority to resolve others to the 
EPA, subject to statutory deadlines and perhaps backed by default rules that 
go into effect if the agency fails to meet those deadlines.  In addition, Con-
gress should avoid blurred responsibilities among multiple federal agencies 
by designating a single agency as the one with the final say on each matter 
covered by a statutory delegation.  The EPA should be the lead agency with 
primary responsibility over mitigation efforts, but control over adaptation 
measures might be shared by agencies that have experience dealing with na-
tional security, disaster relief, resource management, and related problems.  
Finally, Congress should be reluctant to preempt state and local supplemen-
tal measures that do not directly conflict with federal law to avoid stifling 
the development of the vibrant and multifaceted effort needed to meet the 
challenges posed by climate change. 
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